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Create a self-destructing link to share passwords. End-to-end encrypted, zero-knowledge.
Despite a decade of password-manager evangelism, password sharing inside companies is still a daily occurrence. Marketing tools that do not support SSO, vendor portals that issue a single login per account, legacy ERP systems, and shared social-media accounts all create situations where two or more people need the same string. The only question is how it gets handed over.
The default — pasting it into a Slack DM with a teammate — is the single most common credential-leak vector inside healthy companies. Your workspace admin holds an export of every DM ever sent, your offboarding flow does not purge it, and Slack's file retention applies to text in messages just as much as to attachments. Every long-tenure employee leaves with years of pasted credentials searchable in their device's Slack cache.
PasteOnce gives you the closest thing to 'I never sent it.' The recipient's tap destroys the ciphertext, your Slack DM contains only an opaque link that no longer works, and a future workspace export turns up nothing but a dead URL. Combine that with a routine of rotating shared passwords on a schedule, and you have materially shrunk the credential footprint your company carries.
Client-side encrypted. We can't see your data.
Your data is encrypted in your browser before it leaves your device.
Messages are automatically deleted after being read once.
We never see your data. Only encrypted blobs pass through our servers.
Links work exactly once. Refresh the page and it's gone forever.
Your sensitive data is encrypted in your browser using AES-256-GCM. The encryption key is generated randomly and never sent to our servers.
Only the encrypted blob is stored in our database, with an automatic expiration time. We literally cannot read your data.
When your recipient opens the link, the encrypted data is fetched and immediately deleted from our servers using an atomic Redis GETDEL. The key in the URL hash decrypts the message in their browser.
1Password, Bitwarden, Dashlane, and Keeper all support shared vaults. The primary mode of access should be the vault — PasteOnce is for the bootstrap, the recovery moment, or the one-off where the vault is not an option.
Many SaaS tools let the new password-holder reset and immediately set their own. That breaks the chain — only one person ever knew each password, and the original sharer no longer has the live credential.
A password without 2FA is a single point of failure. With 2FA, even a leaked password is useful only to someone who also compromises the second factor — which makes credential leaks loud, not silent.
Pick a date every quarter, rotate every shared-account password, push the new one through PasteOnce to current users, and update the password manager. Old leaks die quickly under steady rotation.
Your team relies on a niche analytics tool with no SSO and a single login. PasteOnce the password to the new hire on day one, log them into the shared vault, and they pull it from the vault on day two onward.
A vendor's billing portal allows only one user. The role rotates between three people on the finance team. Quarterly password rotation plus PasteOnce handoff keeps everyone current without leaving credentials in chat history.
A teammate is going on a two-week vacation and needs to hand off a shared account that someone else has to operate. PasteOnce the credentials, mark a calendar reminder to rotate when they are back, and you have avoided pasting into Slack.
No, it is a complement. A password manager is the long-term shared vault; PasteOnce is the one-time handoff layer for moments when the vault is not yet provisioned, is not yet shared with the recipient, or is not appropriate (e.g., a password you will rotate immediately after sharing).
Yes — PasteOnce will encrypt and deliver any text you paste, current or stale. We do not validate or know what is in the blob.
Do not share live TOTP codes; they are 30-second windows. If you need to give someone access to the same TOTP-protected account, share the seed (the QR-code text) so they can register their own authenticator. Even better: enable per-user 2FA on the account.
No. We deliberately do not keep one — that is the privacy guarantee. If you need an audit trail, layer the password manager's audit log on top of the PasteOnce handoff.